To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: 致$伯克希尔-哈撒韦B(BRK.B)$ 股东:
Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing the savings of a great number of individuals. We are grateful for their enduring trust, a relationship that often spans much of their adult lifetime. It is those dedicated savers that are forefront in my mind as I write this letter.
查理·芒格是我的长期合作伙伴，我和他的工作是管理很多人的储蓄。我们感谢他们持久的信任，这种关系往往贯穿他们成年后的大部分时间。在我写这封信的时候，我首先想到的就是那些热心的储蓄者。
A common belief is that people choose to save when young, expecting thereby to maintain their living standards after retirement. Any assets that remain at death, this theory says, will usually be left to their families or, possibly, to friends and philanthropy.
一种普遍的看法是，人们选择在年轻时存钱，希望以此来维持退休后的生活水平。这一理论认为，死者死后留下的任何资产通常会留给家人，也有可能留给朋友和慈善机构。
Our experience has differed. We believe Berkshire’s individual holders largely to be of the once-a-saver, always-a-saver variety. Though these people live well, they eventually dispense most of their funds to philanthropic organizations. These, in turn, redistribute the funds by expenditures intended to improve the lives of a great many people who are unrelated to the original benefactor. Sometimes, the results have been spectacular.
我们的经历有所不同。我们认为，伯克希尔的个人股东基本上属于“一次储蓄，永远储蓄”的类型。虽然这些人生活得很好，但他们最终会把大部分资金捐给慈善机构。反过来，这些资金又通过旨在改善与原来的捐助者无关的许多人的生活的支出进行重新分配。有时，结果是惊人的。
The disposition of money unmasks humans. Charlie and I watch with pleasure the vast flow of Berkshire-generated funds to public needs and, alongside, the infrequency with which our shareholders opt for look-at-me assets and dynasty-building.
金钱的处置揭示了人的本质。查理和我高兴地看着伯克希尔产生的大量资金流向公共需求，同时，我们的股东很少选择“瞧我多有钱”资产和家族王朝建设。
Who wouldn’t enjoy working for shareholders like ours? 谁不喜欢为我们这样的股东工作呢?
Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership. First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.
查理和我把你们在伯克希尔的存款分配给两种相关的所有权形式。首先，我们投资于我们控制的企业，通常是100%的收购。伯克希尔对这些子公司进行资本配置，并挑选出负责日常运营决策的首席执行官。在管理大型企业时，信任和规则都是必不可少的。伯克希尔对前者的强调达到了一种不同寻常的——有些人会说是极端的程度。失望在所难免。我们理解商业错误;我们对个人不端行为的容忍度为零。
In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management.
在我们的第二类所有权中，我们购买公开交易的股票，通过这些股票我们被动地拥有企业的一部分。持有这些投资，我们在管理上没有发言权。
Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers. Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.
我们两种所有权形式的目标都是对具有长期良好经济特征和值得信赖的管理者的企业进行有意义的投资。请特别注意，我们持有公开交易的股票是基于我们对其长期业务表现的预期，而不是因为我们将其视为灵活买卖的工具。这一点很关键: 查理和我都不是选股者; 我们是生意人。
Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal. Along the way, other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public. Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. Schumpeter called this phenomenon “creative destruction.”
这些年来，我犯了很多错误。因此，我们目前广泛收集的企业包括少数真正具有非凡经济效益的企业，许多企业享有非常好的经济特征，还有一大群企业处于边缘地位。在此过程中，我投资的其他企业已经倒闭，它们的产品不受公众欢迎。资本主义有两面性: 这一体系创造了越来越多的输家，同时提供了大量改善的商品和服务。熊彼特称这种现象为“创造性破坏”。
One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.
我们的可交易股票部门的一个优势是，偶尔可以很容易地以极好的价格收购一些极好的企业。重要的是要明白，股票交易的价格往往非常愚蠢，无论是高还是低。“有效”市场只存在于教科书中。事实上，有市场的股票和债券令人困惑，它们的行为通常只有在回顾时才能理解。
Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation.
受控企业则是另一种类型。它们的价格有时高得离谱，但几乎从来没有便宜的估值。除非受到胁迫，控股企业的所有者不会考虑以恐慌性估值出售。
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At this point, a report card from me is appropriate: In 58 years of Berkshire management, most of my capital-allocation decisions have been no better than so-so. In some cases, also, bad moves by me have been rescued by very large doses of luck. (Remember our escapes from near-disasters at USAir and Salomon? I certainly do.)
在限制这一个时点，展示一下我的成绩单是合适的: 在伯克希尔58年的管理中，我的大部分资本配置决策都不怎么样。此外，在某些情况下，我的坏棋也会被大量的运气所挽救。(还记得我们从美国航空公司(USAir)和所罗门(Salomon)的险些灾难中逃生吗? 我当然记得。)
Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions – that would be about one every five years – and a sometimes-forgotten advantage that favors long-term investors such as Berkshire. Let’s take a peek behind the curtain.
我们令人满意的业绩来自于十几个真正好的决策——大约每五年一个决策——以及一个有时被遗忘的优势，这个优势有利于伯克希尔这样的长期投资者。让我们看一看幕后。
In August 1994 – yes, 1994 – Berkshire completed its seven-year purchase of the 400 million shares of Coca-Cola we now own. The total cost was $1.3 billion – then a very meaningful sum at Berkshire.
1994年8月——是的，1994年——伯克希尔完成了对我们现在持有的4亿股可口可乐的7年收购。总成本为13亿美元——当时对伯克希尔来说是一笔非常有意义的数目。
The cash dividend we received from Coke in 1994 was $75 million. By 2022, the dividend had increased to $704 million. Growth occurred every year, just as certain as birthdays. All Charlie and I were required to do was cash Coke’s quarterly dividend checks. We expect that those checks are highly likely to grow.
1994年我们从可口可乐公司获得的现金分红是7500万美元。到2022年，股息增加到7.04亿美元。成长每年都在发生，就像生日一样确定无疑。查理和我只需要兑现可口可乐的季度股息支票就可以了。我们预计这些支票很可能会增加。
American Express is much the same story. Berkshire’s purchases of Amex were essentially completed in 1995 and, coincidentally, also cost $1.3 billion. Annual dividends received from this investment have grown from $41 million to $302 million. Those checks, too, seem highly likely to increase.
美国运通(American Express)的情况大致相同。伯克希尔对美国运通的收购基本上在1995年完成，巧合的是，也花费了13亿美元。从这项投资中获得的年度股息从4100万美元增长到3.02亿美元。这些支票似乎也极有可能增加。
These dividend gains, though pleasing, are far from spectacular. But they bring with them important gains in stock prices. At yearend, our Coke investment was valued at $25 billion while Amex was recorded at $22 billion. Each holding now accounts for roughly 5% of Berkshire’s net worth, akin to its weighting long ago.
这些股息收益虽然令人满意，但远谈不上惊人。但它们也带来了股票价格的重要上涨。在年底，我们对可口可乐的投资价值250亿美元，而美国运通的价值为220亿美元。目前每份持股约占伯克希尔净资产的5%，与很久以前的权重相当。
Assume, for a moment, I had made a similarly-sized investment mistake in the 1990s, one that flat-lined and simply retained its $1.3 billion value in 2022. (An example would be a high-grade 30-year bond.) That disappointing investment would now represent an insignificant 0.3% of Berkshire’s net worth and would be delivering to us an unchanged $80 million or so of annual income.
假设我在上世纪90年代犯了一个类似规模的投资错误，在2022年保持了13亿美元的价值。(比如30年期高等级债券)。这笔令人失望的投资现在只会占伯克希尔净资产的微不足道的0.3%，并将为我们带来8000万美元左右不变的年收入。
The lesson for investors: The weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom. Over time, it takes just a few winners to work wonders. And, yes, it helps to start early and live into your 90s as well.
给投资者的教训是: 花开花落，杂草只会枯萎。随着时间的推移，只需要几个赢家就能创造奇迹。而且，是的，早点开始投资、活到90多岁也有帮助。
Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at $30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual:
伯克希尔在2022年业绩不错。该公司的营业利润 (我们定义为使用公认会计原则(“GAAP”)计算的收入，但是不包括股权持有的资本收益或损失) 创下308亿美元的记录。查理和我专注于这个实际数字，并敦促你也这样做。美国公认会计准则(GAAP)数据，如果没有我们的调整，在每个报告日都会剧烈波动。请注意它在2022年的杂技行为，这并不罕见:
The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.
从季度甚至年度来看，美国公认会计准则的收益是100%具有误导性的。可以肯定的是，在过去几十年里，资本利得对伯克希尔来说非常重要，我们预计在未来几十年里，资本利得将显著增加。但它们的季度环比波动——经常被媒体盲目报道——完全误导了投资者。
A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance. Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.
伯克希尔去年的第二个积极进展是我们收购了由乔·布兰登(Joe Brandon)担任董事长的财产意外保险公司Alleghany Corporation。我过去曾与乔共事，他对伯克希尔和保险都很了解。Alleghany 对我们来说具有特殊的价值，因为伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使其保险子公司能够遵循几乎所有竞争对手都无法遵循的有价值和持久的投资策略。
Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from $147 billion to $164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations. Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.
在Alleghany的帮助下，我们的保险浮存金在2022年从1470亿美元增加到1640亿美元。通过严格的承销，随着时间的推移，这些资金有相当大的机会实现零成本。自1967年收购第一家财产意外险公司以来，通过收购、运营和创新，伯克希尔的浮存金增长了8,000倍。虽然在我们的财务报表中没有得到确认，但这笔浮存金对伯克希尔来说是一笔非凡的资产。新股东可以通过阅读A-2页我们每年更新的浮存金解释来了解其价值。
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A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours. At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.
2022年，通过伯克希尔股票回购以及$苹果(AAPL)$ 和美国运通的类似举措，我们的每股内在价值获得了非常小的增长，这两家公司都是我们的重要投资对象。在伯克希尔，我们通过回购1.2%的公司流通股，直接增加了您对我们独特业务组合的兴趣。在苹果和美国运通，回购增加了伯克希尔的持股比例，而我们没有付出任何代价。
The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.
计算并不复杂: 当股份数量下降时，你在我们许多业务上的权益比例就会上升。如果回购以增值的价格进行，那么每一点都有帮助。同样可以肯定的是，当一家公司支付过多的回购费用时，持续持有股票的股东就会蒙受损失。在这种时候，收益只会流向抛售股票的股东，以及那些友好但昂贵的投资银行家，他们推荐了愚蠢的购买。
Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?
应该强调的是，增值回购带来的收益在各个方面都有利于所有所有者。想象一下，如果你愿意，当地一家汽车经销商的三个完全知情的股东，其中一人管理着该业务。再进一步想象一下，其中一个被动股东希望以对两个持续股东有吸引力的价格将自己的权益卖回给公司。交易完成后，是否对任何人造成了伤害? 那个管理者是否比那个持续持有的被动股东更受益?公众受到伤害了吗?
When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).
当有人告诉你，所有的回购行为都对股东或国家有害，或者对首席执行官特别有利时，你要么是在听一个经济文盲说话，要么是在听一个能言善辩的煽动家说话 (这两个角色并不相互排斥)。
Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own.
伯克希尔2022年的运营细节几乎无穷无尽地列在K-33 - K-66页上。查理和我，以及伯克希尔的许多股东，都喜欢仔细研究这部分列出的许多事实和数据。然而，这几页不是必读的。伯克希尔有很多百万富翁，是的，亿万富翁，他们从来没有研究过我们的财务数据。他们只是知道查理和我——以及我们的家人和亲密的朋友——继续在伯克希尔有非常重要的投资，他们相信我们会像对待自己的钱一样对待他们的钱。
And that is a promise we can make. 这是我们可以做出的承诺。
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Finally, an important warning: Even the operating earnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.
最后，一个重要的警告: 即使是我们喜欢看的营业利润数据，也很容易被希望这样做的经理操纵。首席执行官、董事和他们的顾问通常认为这种篡改行为很老练。记者和分析人士也欣然接受它的存在。超“预期”利润被视为管理的胜利。
That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.
那种活动真恶心。操纵数字不需要天赋，只需要欺骗的强烈欲望。一位首席执行官曾对我说，“大胆而富有想象力的会计”已经成为资本主义的耻辱之一。
In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New England textile operation. With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems.
1965年，伯克希尔还是只会一招的小马，拥有一家历史悠久但注定要失败的新英格兰纺织企业。由于该业务正处于死亡行军中，伯克希尔需要立即有个新的开始。回首往事，我迟迟才意识到问题的严重性。
And then came a stroke of good luck: National Indemnity became available in 1967, and we shifted our resources toward insurance and other non-textile operations.
然后，幸运的是:1967年，有了收购国民保险公司的机会，于是我们将资源转移到保险和其他非纺织业务上。
Thus began our journey to 2023, a bumpy road involving a combination of continuous savings by our owners (that is, by their retaining earnings), the power of compounding, our avoidance of major mistakes and – most important of all – the American Tailwind. America would have done fine without Berkshire. The reverse is not true.
就这样，我们开始了通往2023年的旅程，这是一条坎坷的道路，涉及了我们股东( 通过他们的留存利润)的持续储蓄、复利的力量、我们的避免重大错误，以及最重要的——美国顺风。没有伯克希尔，美国也能做得很好。反之则不然。
Berkshire now enjoys major ownership in an unmatched collection of huge and diversified businesses. Let’s first look at the 5,000 or so publicly-held companies that trade daily on NASDAQ, the NYSE and related venues. Within this group is housed the members of the S&P 500 Index, an elite collection of large and well-known American companies.
伯克希尔现在拥有无与伦比的庞大而多样化的业务。让我们先来看看每天在纳斯达克(NASDAQ)、纽约证交所(NYSE)及相关市场交易的约5000家上市公司。标准普尔500指数(S&P 500 Index)的成份股都在这个群体中，这是一个由大型知名美国公司组成的精英群体。
In aggregate, the 500 earned $1.8 trillion in 2021. I don’t yet have the final results for 2022. Using, therefore, the 2021 figures, only 128 of the 500 (including Berkshire itself) earned $3 billion or more. Indeed, 23 lost money.
这500强企业在2021年的总收入为1.8万亿美元。我还没有2022年的最终结果。因此，使用2021年的数据，500强中只有128家(包括伯克希尔本身)的收入在30亿美元或以上。确实，23家还赔钱了。
At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eight of these giants: American Express, Bank of America, Chevron, Coca-Cola, HP Inc., Moody’s, Occidental Petroleum and Paramount Global.
截至2022年底，伯克希尔是其中八家巨头的最大股东:美国运通、美国银行、雪佛龙、可口可乐、惠普公司、穆迪、西方石油公司和派拉蒙全球。
In addition to those eight investees, Berkshire owns 100% of BNSF and 92% of BH Energy, each with earnings that exceed the $3 billion mark noted above ($5.9 billion at BNSF and $4.3 billion at BHE). Were these companies publicly-owned, they would replace two present members of the 500.
除了这八家被投资方，伯克希尔还拥有BNSF铁路 100%的股权和伯克希尔电力（BHE）92%的股权，每家公司的收益都超过了上文提到的30亿美元大关(BNSF 59亿美元，BHE 43亿美元)。如果这些公司是上市公司，它们将取代目前500强中的两家公司。
All told, our ten controlled and non-controlled behemoths leave Berkshire more broadly aligned with the country’s economic future than is the case at any other U.S. company. (This calculation leaves aside “fiduciary” operations such as pension funds and investment companies.) In addition, Berkshire’s insurance operation, though conducted through many individually-managed subsidiaries, has a value comparable to BNSF or BHE.
总的来说，我们的十家控股和非控股巨头使伯克希尔比任何其他美国公司都更广泛地与国家的经济未来保持一致。(这一计算没有考虑养老基金和投资公司等“信托”业务。) 此外，伯克希尔的保险业务虽然通过许多独立管理的子公司进行，但其价值与BNSF或BHE相当。
As for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and U.S. Treasury bills along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses. Our CEO will always be the Chief Risk Officer – a task it is irresponsible to delegate. Additionally, our future CEOs will have a significant part of their net worth in Berkshire shares, bought with their own money. And yes, our shareholders will continue to save and prosper by retaining earnings.
至于未来，伯克希尔将始终持有大量现金和美国国债，以及广泛的业务。我们还将避免在不方便的时候导致不舒服的现金需求的行为，包括在金融恐慌和前所未有的保险损失时。我们的首席执行官将永远是首席风险官——将这项任务委派他人是不负责任的。此外，我们未来的首席执行官将用他们自己的钱购买伯克希尔的股票，这将是他们净资产的很大一部分。是的，我们的股东将继续通过公司留存利润来储蓄和兴隆昌盛。
At Berkshire, there will be no finish line. 在伯克希尔，没有终点线。
During the decade ending in 2021, the United States Treasury received about $32.3 trillion in taxes while it spent $43.9 trillion.
在截至2021年的10年里，美国财政部的税收收入约为32.3万亿美元，而支出为43.9万亿美元。
Though economists, politicians and many of the public have opinions about the consequences of that huge imbalance, Charlie and I plead ignorance and firmly believe that near-term economic and market forecasts are worse than useless. Our job is to manage Berkshire’s operations and finances in a manner that will achieve an acceptable result over time and that will preserve the company’s unmatched staying power when financial panics or severe worldwide recessions occur. Berkshire also offers some modest protection from runaway inflation, but this attribute is far from perfect. Huge and entrenched fiscal deficits have consequences.
尽管经济学家、政治家和许多公众都对这种巨大失衡的后果有自己的看法，但查理和我以无知为借口，坚信短期的经济和市场预测并非一无是处。我们的工作是管理伯克希尔的运营和财务，以一种随着时间的推移将取得可接受的结果的方式，在金融恐慌或严重的全球衰退发生时保持公司无与伦比的持久力。伯克希尔也为通胀失控提供了一定程度的保护，但这一点还远远不够完美。巨额且根深蒂固的财政赤字是有后果的。
The $32 trillion of revenue was garnered by the Treasury through individual income taxes (48%), social security and related receipts (341¤2%), corporate income tax payments (81¤2%) and a wide variety of lesser levies. Berkshire’s contribution via the corporate income tax was $32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the Treasury collected.
32万亿美元的财政收入是由财政部通过个人所得税(48%)、社会保障和相关收入(34.5%)、企业所得税(8.5%)和各种各样的小额税收获得的。在这十年中，伯克希尔通过企业所得税贡献了320亿美元，几乎正好是财政部税收总额千分之一
And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S. matching Berkshire’s payments, no other businesses nor any of the country’s 131 million households would have needed to pay any taxes to the federal government. Not a dime.
这意味着——请做好准备——如果美国有大约1000名纳税人也支付伯克希尔那么多的税款，那么就没有其他企业或美国1.31亿家庭需要向联邦政府缴纳任何税款。一分钱也不用。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Millions, billions, trillions – we all know the words, but the sums involved are almost impossible to comprehend. Let’s put physical dimensions to the numbers:
数百万、数十亿、数万亿——我们都知道这些词，但其中涉及的金额几乎无法理解。让我们用物理维度来表示这些数字:
· If you convert $1 million into newly-printed $100 bills, you will have a stack that reaches your chest.
· 如果你把100万美元兑换成新印的100美元，你会有一叠堆到你胸口的钞票。
· Perform the same exercise with $1 billion – this is getting exciting! – and the stack reaches about 3¤4 of a mile into the sky.
· 用10亿美元做同样的练习——这越来越令人兴奋了! - 这堆钱达到了大约四分之三英里的高度。
· Finally, imagine piling up $32 billion, the total of Berkshire’s 2012-21 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height, about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise.
· 最后，想象一下伯克希尔2012-21年度联邦所得税支付总额达到320亿美元。现在，这堆钱的高度已经超过了21英里，大约是商用飞机通常巡航高度的三倍。
When it comes to federal taxes, individuals who own Berkshire can unequivocally state “I gave at the office.” 当涉及到联邦税收时，拥有伯克希尔的个人可以明确地说“我已经在办公室交过了”。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade. We owe the country no less: America’s dynamism has made a huge contribution to whatever success Berkshire has achieved – a contribution Berkshire will always need. We count on the American Tailwind and, though it has been becalmed from time to time, its propelling force has always returned.
在伯克希尔，我们希望并期望在未来十年缴纳更多的税款。我们同样亏欠这个国家:美国的活力对伯克希尔取得的任何成功都做出了巨大贡献——伯克希尔永远都需要这种贡献。我们依靠的是美国顺风，虽然它有时会停滞不前，但它的推动力总是回来的。
I have been investing for 80 years – more than one-third of our country’s lifetime. Despite our citizens’ penchant – almost enthusiasm – for self-criticism and self-doubt, I have yet to see a time when it made sense to make a long-term bet against America. And I doubt very much that any reader of this letter will have a different experience in the future.
我从事投资已经80年了，超过了我国历史的三分之一。尽管我们的公民有自我批评和自我怀疑的倾向——甚至可以说是热情——但我还没有看到有什么时候有理由长期做空美国。我非常怀疑这封信的读者将来会有不同的体验。
Charlie and I think pretty much alike. But what it takes me a page to explain, he sums up in a sentence. His version, moreover, is always more clearly reasoned and also more artfully – some might add bluntly – stated.
查理和我想法很相似。但我花了一页纸解释的东西，他可以用一句话总结出来。此外，他的版本总是更清楚地推理，也更巧妙地——有些人可能会说——更直言不讳。
Here are a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast:
以下是他的一些想法，很多摘自最近的播客:
· The world is full of foolish gamblers, and they will not do as well as the patient investor.
· 世界上到处都是愚蠢的赌徒，他们不会比耐心的投资者更成功。
· If you don’t see the world the way it is, it’s like judging something through a distorted lens.
· 如果你不接受世界的现实情况，那就像是通过扭曲的镜头来判断事物。
· All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. And a related thought: Early on, write your desired obituary – and then behave accordingly.
· 我只想知道我将死在哪里，这样我就永远不会去那里。还有一个相关的想法: 在早期，写下你想要的讣告——然后相应地行动。
· If you don’t care whether you are rational or not, you won’t work on it. Then you will stay irrational and get lousy results.
· 如果你不在乎自己是否理性，你就不会努力。这样你就会变得不理智，结果会很糟糕。
· Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one thing for a long time is a huge advantage.
· 耐心是可以学会的。注意力持续时间长，能够长时间专注于一件事是一个巨大的优势。
· You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest.
· 你可以从死人身上学到很多东西。阅读一下关于你钦佩或者厌恶的死者。
· Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy.
·如果你能游到一艘适航的船，就不要继续在下沉的船上勺水。
· A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that.
· 一家伟大的公司会在你退休后继续运转;一个平庸的公司不会这么做。
· Warren and I don’t focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time.
· 沃伦和我不关注市场的泡沫。我们寻找好的长期投资，并顽固地长期持有。
· Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term it’s a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying.
· 本·格雷厄姆(Ben Graham)说过: “日复一日，股市都是一台投票机; 从长远来看，它就是一台称重机。” 如果你不断创造更有价值的东西，那么一些明智的人就会注意到它，并开始购买。
· There is no such thing as a 100% sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don’t count on getting rich twice.
· 投资时没有百分之百的把握。因此，使用杠杆是危险的。一串奇妙的数字乘以0总是等于0。不要指望能富两次。
· You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich.
· 然而，你不需要为了致富而拥有很多东西。
· You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes, you must change.
· 如果你想成为一名伟大的投资者，你必须不断学习。当世界发生变化， 你必须改变。
· Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never.
· 沃伦和我讨厌铁路股有几十年了，但世界变了，最终美国有了四条对美国经济至关重要的大型铁路。我们迟迟没有意识到这种变化，但迟到总比不到好。
· Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it. You’re smart and I’m right.”
· 最后，我要加上查理的两句话，这两句话几十年来一直是他做决定的关键: “沃伦，再考虑一下。你很聪明，而我是对的。”
And so it goes. I never have a phone call with Charlie without learning something. And, while he makes me think, he also makes me laugh.
就这样。每次和查理通话，我都会有所收获。而且，当他让我思考时，他也让我笑。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I will add to Charlie’s list a rule of my own: Find a very smart high-grade partner – preferably slightly older than you – and then listen very carefully to what he says.
我将在查理的清单上加上我自己的一条规则:找一个非常聪明的高质量伙伴——最好比你稍年长一点——然后非常仔细地听他说什么。
Charlie and I are shameless. Last year, at our first shareholder get-together in three years, we greeted you with our usual commercial hustle.
查理和我真是不要脸。去年，在我们三年来的第一次股东大会上，我们一如既往地以繁忙的商业活动迎接大家。
From the opening bell, we went straight for your wallet. In short order, our See’s kiosk sold you eleven tons of nourishing peanut brittle and chocolates. In our P.T. Barnum pitch, we promised you longevity. After all, what else but candy from See’s could account for Charlie and me making it to 99 and 92?
从开市铃一响，我们就直奔你的钱包。在短时间内，我们的喜诗小摊卖给你11吨有营养的花生糖和巧克力。在我们的P.T.巴纳姆演讲中，我们向你保证过长寿。毕竟，除了喜诗的糖果，还有什么能解释查理和我能活到99年和92岁呢?
I know you can’t wait to hear the specifics of last year’s hustle.
知道你迫不及待地想知道去年的工作细节。
On Friday, the doors were open from noon until 5 p.m., and our candy counters rang up 2,690 individual sales. On Saturday, See’s registered an additional 3,931 transactions between 7 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., despite the fact that 61¤2 of the 91¤2 operating hours occurred while our movie and the question-and-answer session were limiting commercial traffic.
周五，大门从中午一直开到下午5点，我们的糖果柜台共卖出了2690份。周六上午7点至下午4点半，尽管在9.5小时的营业时间中，有6.5小时因为电影放映和问答环节而限制商业人流量，喜诗新增了3931笔交易。
Do the math: See’s rang up about 10 sales per minute during its prime operating time (racking up $400,309 of volume during the two days), with all the goods purchased at a single location selling products that haven’t been materially altered in 101 years. What worked for See’s in the days of Henry Ford’s model T works now.
算算看: 喜诗在其黄金营业时间内，每分钟约有10笔销售(两天内销售额达400,309美元)，所有在同一地点购买的商品都是101年没有实质性改变的产品。在亨利·福特T型车时代对喜诗管用的方法现在也管用。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Charlie, I, and the entire Berkshire bunch look forward to seeing you in Omaha on May 5-6. We will have a good time and so will you.
查理，我和整个伯克希尔公司都期待着5月5-6日在奥马哈见到你。我们会玩得很开心，你也会。
February 25, 2023 Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board
2023年2月25日，沃伦·E·巴菲特，董事会主席
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