黄金即将迎来令人振奋的辉煌的一天：吉姆·格兰特警告说，没有人准备好迎接“更高、更高、更长时间的本质”
撰写作者： Christoph Gisiger，来自 TheMarket.ch，
世界正在经历历史性的利率飙升。 《格兰特利率观察家》编辑吉姆·格兰特认为， 持续的动荡可能是长达数年的债券熊市的开始。
在这次深度采访中，他解释了风险是什么以及机遇在哪里。
飙升出乎意料：在美国，10年期国债收益率迅速升至5%，为2007年以来的最高水平。从欧洲到日本再到澳大利亚，世界各地的长期利率也呈上升趋势。关于其原因有很多猜测。然而，显而易见的是，这种冲击不会没有后果。
“这提出了一个有趣的可能性，即我们正在进入一个新的债券熊市，” 标志性投资公报 《格兰特利率观察家》的编辑吉姆·格兰特说。«债券在金融资产领域是不寻常的，因为它们的价格历来倾向于以代际长度为区间的趋势；这是我们在股票或大宗商品中看不到的东西”，他补充道。
在这篇对《The Market NZZ》的深度采访中，这位经验丰富的金融史专家解释了持续走高的利率对投资者意味着什么、与这种新环境相关的风险以及长期的影响。任期机会出现。
“我认为黄金不应该作为通胀对冲工具进行交易，而应该作为对货币混乱的投资，而我们在世界上的货币混乱已经足够了”：吉姆·格兰特。
格兰特先生，《格兰特利率观察家》正在 庆祝其成立 40 周年。您目前对金融市场正在经历的利率大幅飙升有何观察？
嗯，我们当然有一些东西需要观察。已经过去很长时间了，所以我想说几句话。一是利率从接近零到利率敲响正常之门的变化——这种上升速度——是我们以前很少看到的。这就像一辆汽车在四秒内从0 英里每小时加速到 60 英里每小时。因此，这是一种非常迅速的增长，人们可能会猜想，这是一种非常具有破坏性的增长，因为它的速度如此之快。
怎样才能把这次债券市场的动荡放到历史的角度来看呢？
这提出了一个有趣的可能性，即我们正在进入新的债券熊市。债券在金融资产领域很不寻常，因为从历史上看，债券的价格往往以一代人的时间间隔为趋势。我们在股票或大宗商品中很少看到这种情况。
过去这样的世代循环是如何发生的？
在美国，从南北战争结束前后的35年到19世纪末，债券收益率一直在下降。然后，它们在 20 年的时间里缓慢上涨，然后从1921 年左右到 1946 年再次下跌。接下来，战后债券大熊市开始，收益率在 1981 年一路攀升至 15%。此后，债券大熊市开始了。牛市开始，收益率在 2021 年降至 1%。当然，在欧洲和日本，短期证券的收益率甚至远低于零，高达 16 万亿美元的证券定价为收益率低于零。
对于当今的环境，可以从中得出什么结论？
追溯到大约 150 年前，债券牛市和熊市经历了一连串，每次都至少持续 20 年。因此，也许自 2021 年以来，我们已经开始了收益率的长期上涨——如果是这样的话，口号不应该是“收益率持续更长的时间”，而是“收益率持续更长、更多、更长的时间”。话又说回来，没有任何证据表明这种模式识别练习一定能保证任何未来的结果。但无论如何，这是描述债券收益率最猛烈、最剧烈上涨的一种方式。
您为什么认为债券市场可能已经开始新的周期？
有一种思考方式：1981 年，里根总统看到空中交通管制员工会威胁要罢工。因此他警告他们不要罢工，认为这是针对公众的，而且是非法的。不管怎样，空中交通管制员还是罢工了，所以里根把他们全部解雇了，并引进了新的。那是利率达到顶峰的时候。这是一个时代的标记。当时，我们并不知道长达 45 年的债券熊市已经结束。这是一个象征性的结局：里根总统打破了这个重要的联盟。这是一个改变；这就像 1980 年大宗商品价格的突破一样。
而这和现在的情况有什么关系呢？
快进到今天，另一位总统乔·拜登前往底特律。他走在纠察线上声援汽车工会的罢工者，鼓励他们：“坚持住，你做到了！” 对我来说，这是另一个时代的标志，另一种预兆。因此，我们可能会在很长一段时间内将利率提高很多很多。而且，我们可能不仅进入了一个通货膨胀周期，而且进入了一个通货膨胀时代。
那么我们是否应该预期债券市场会进一步震荡呢？
We’ve just talked about how fast this bond bear market we’re hypothesizing about has been to date. But we haven’t talked about the tempo. For instance, at the beginning of the previous bond bear market in 1964, it took ten years for the yield on long-dated treasuries to go from 2¼% to 3¼%. So nothing says that the current rate of speed is going to continue. As a matter of fact, it can’t continue because otherwise rates would need three digits to write them down. So based on form, on the historical precedent, the tempo is going to be very measured at times. In other words, it might just be that for a certain time, the bond market won’t be very dramatic at all. Yet, it won’t go back to 2%, which will be good for some people, not good for others, but in any case, very different from what we’ve seen over the last four decades.
What are the consequences of this fundamental change for investments?
During the course of not one investment career, but rather one and a half investment careers, the whole world has become accustomed to interest rates basically only going in one direction. Of course, there was plenty of volatility along the way, but persistent, if not continuous declines in rates have been the norm for the careers and investment minds of most living human beings. Consequently, expectations are deeply embedded in our collective psyche that rates do one thing, which is to decline. Yet here we are, observing them go up. So it’s no wonder th很多人都不愿意相信这一点。这是非常不规则的，而且完全不符合我们很多很多年前的集体经验。
那么这将如何改变投资环境呢？
在 1981 年开始的长期债券牛市期间，可以可靠地预期债券和股票的走势相反：股票上涨，债券下跌，反之亦然。因此，债券为股票风险提供了良好的对冲或缓冲。很长一段时间都是这种情况，当债券产生一定收益时，这种情况尤其有吸引力。事实上，最近 1984 年的长期国债收益率为 14%，最近的 1987 年则高达 10%。因此，在过去 40 年的大部分时间里，债券不仅提供了投资组合平衡，而且还提供了大量利息一路上的收入。
还有今天？
This advantageous arrangement ended, or at least became much less advantageous, during the long period of zero percent rates and QE: Bonds yielded very little and might have provided some cushion, if stocks decline. But there was no great interest income for a long time from one’s bond position. Today however, there is a possibility that bonds and stocks could decline at the same time, as was the case for many years in the last bond bear market, beginning in the late Sixties and continuing into the early Eighties. So correlations could change. The popular 60/40 portfolio could deliver disappointing returns, rather than persistently attractive ones – and that too would be a big change in the investment weather.
That’s not exactly an uplifting outlook.
这并不是说，在收益率持续上升的时期，从储户、长期投资者的角度来看，没有一些明显的优势。固定收益投资的经典著作之一是一本名为“Inside the Yield Book”的书，作者：马丁·莱博维茨和西德尼·霍默。它问世的时候，收益率已经被印刷并装订成书，在数字时代、彭博时代之前。1972 年版《收益率手册》第一章的标题是《利息上的利息》。它描述了债券投资者以利率上升的方式投资半年期息票的算术，指出长期利息可贡献高达总回报的一半。它进一步指出，在收益率上升的时期，到期收益率将高于您购买债券的收益率，因为您将不是按照票面利率进行投资，而是按照不断增加的利率进行投资。
这种复合效应到底是如何发挥作用的呢？
Let’s say, you buy a 6% bond maturing in thirty years. In a bond bull market with continually declining interest rates, you reinvested that 6% coupon in ever lower rates and thereby ever lower returns. So the yield to maturity was not 6%, but something less than that. Now, imagine you purchase that same security today in an environment with persistently, if not continuously rising rates over the next thirty or forty years. The rate you earn on that coupon won’t be 6%. It’s likely to be something higher, and therefore your yield to maturity is going to be better than 6%.
So a bear market in bonds also brings benefits?
Indeed. For investors, it opens up another new vista to come: opportunities for interest on interest. Of course, this does not apply to people who need coupon income to pay their rent and buy their groceries. But for savers, for pension funds, for sovereign wealth funds, for people who are in the business of reinvesting their interest income this is a not-disadvantageous thing, this bond bear market. But again, to re-emphasize: This is all hypothetical, I don’t want to sound like some cocksure dogmatic prophet, which I assure you I am not.
But let’s assume you are correct in your thesis on the future development of interest rates. In principle, do bonds therefore offer an attractive alternative to equities in the portfolio?
Yes, what is old will be new again. Bonds really earn something besides nothing or less than nothing which was the case for a long time. But as mentioned earlier, it’s going to take some time getting used to it. So far, the stock market pretends not to notice. This seems surprising. As we point out in a recent issue of «Grant’s», the volatility of the bond market is very elevated, whereas the volatility of the stock market is very subdued. So you have to ask yourself: How can complacency reign in junior securities, when anxiety is the mood in the market of senior securities? This doesn’t make intuitive sense.
Where could the pressure of rising rates cause major problems?
I suspect that this most sudden and even violent lurch higher in interest rates is going to test financial structures that came into being during the period of very low nominal interest rates. Think of what all came into being, when money was proverbially free from 2010 to 2021: Cryptocurrencies flourished, dito venture capital and private equity. There were no constraints on sovereign debt issuance, so public credit was expanded dramatically. Interest expense seemed to be forever minimal and not worrisome because, after all, rates would never rise. To some degree, the entire world was capitalized on the expectation of extremely low interest rates.
And how do things look now?
All that has changed, but not in the expectations yet. I think people are still trying to deal with the shock of the perception of the possibility of much higher rates for a long time. Not every company has had to refinance so far, not every private equity company has met a hostile reception in the credit markets, and not every country has had to face the consequences of a potentially ruinously high national invoice for interest expense. All this is still in the making. So I’m not so quick to believe that this rise in rates, as dramatic as it has been, is going to be solitary or helpful just to savers. No, I think it’s a much, much deeper phenomenon and we’ll learn more about it in the coming fiscal quarters and years. That’s for sure.
With the crisis facing British pension funds and the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, we have already seen two situations with major turmoil. Do you expect further stress in the system?
Who knows, but the protracted selloff in US treasuries is properly raising concerns that the March regional banking crisis never ended but only took the summer off. All-time low interest rates beguiled, seduced and even coerced people into doing things they would not have done perhaps except for interest rates that were not the product of the marketplace but rather the product of the models of the central bankers of the world. The problem with 4%, 5% and 6% interest rates today is not 4%, 5% and 6% on their face. The real problem is the preceding regime of zero percent rates, and the debt accumulation that those rates fostered and brought into being.
Then again, interest rates could also fall again. Or to put it another way: What are the specific forces that could foster a long bear market in bonds?
One cause might be an embedded, what they call, structural inflation. If inflation is part of the times, the spirit of the age, that could be one driver. Another cause could be a deterioration of public credit. For a long time, the United States has been in the privileged position of being the one and only superpower and the issuer of the one and only reserve currency of the world. But in its humanity, America is not so very different from other countries.
What do you mean by that?
Essentially, the privilege of consuming much more than you produce is sort of the poisoned chalice gift of a reserve currency. It’s like saying: All right, you can pay your bills in your currency you alone can produce and the world will accept it because of your evident strength and enterprise and power. If Uganda, Britain, Singapore or even Switzerland was given this privilege, I imagine any other country would have done the same. But what we have done in America is that we brought up immense net international debts and very large domestic sovereign debts. So altogether a lot of debts, financed with the dollar which – as we convinced ourselves – is kind of the Coca-Cola or Microsoft of monetary world brands. That’s a very seductive thing to have come to believe.
So the dollar as the world’s reserve currency is proving to be a curse?
When we speak about the troubles in public credit, that’s another way of saying there are more bonds on offer than are demanded at prevailing rates of interest. The United States has been downgraded by Standard & Poors’ and by Fitch, and Moody’s maybe would prefer to do the same. America is a Triple-A country in many respects. The Statue of Liberty, the Declaration of Independence, you can’t downgrade those. It’s part of the whole business model of this country, and it’s a pretty good business model. But financially speaking, we have taken advantage of these things; the things that make America truly what it is – not the financial gimmicks that make us more encumbered than we ought to be.
Nevertheless, the US economy is doing remarkably well by international comparisons. This is despite the fact that virtually everyone had feared that the economy would cool down significantly as a result of rising interest rates.
I thought that combination of an inverted yield curve and the contraction of monetary growth together were pretty strong signals of a pending recession. So again, it turns out there are no surefire indicators. But obviously, a recession will come at some time, and I think it will have its origins in the unhealthy capital structures caused by the suppression of interest rates and the distortion that suppression has brought about over the course of more than a decade. To me, that’s going to be the proximate cause of the next financial difficulties, being part and parcel of the next recession.
What is the best way to navigate this environment as a European investor based in Zurich, for example?
I would think that you would continue to look at companies in a company-by-company way. However, you would not be ignorant of the fact that the spread between the American equity market cap and the market cap of the rest of the world is at a record high. So everyone owns America already, and has been well paid for that. But it’s a big world, and there might be opportunities elsewhere as well as in America.
Where else do you spot attractive opportunities for investments?
Here’s a question: When you’re looking around for a currency, if you want to hold money in some form, are you really sure you want to hold it in dollars, or in competing fiat currencies? In this regard, I might have mentioned gold once or twice before in our previous conversations. So I would say to the gnomes of Zurich: Don’t forget what got you here! Don’t turn your little backs on gold. But seriously, I think that gold is going to have its day. It really has not had its day yet, as I see it.
Gold has experienced a strong surge in recent weeks. What speaks for further gains?
I think gold ought not to trade as an inflation hedge, but as an investment in monetary disorder of which we surely have enough in the world. So it’s a question of getting people interested in the problem, and then in the solution. If you want to go back and look at the long cycles, it might just be that the fifty odd years since the end of Bretton Woods and the end of the dollar’s convertibility to gold, that that cycle is ending. It might be that paper money in the historians’ retro perspective views will seem to have been a failure and that the world is going to charge back on unconstrained central bank credit creation 和 u不受约束的主权借款。也许，这是看待它的一种方式。这就是我看待这些事情的方式：长期的、历史的趋势——而货币历史的五十年只是一眨眼的时间。
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