| In an angry confrontation with executives at Tokyo Electric Power on Wednesday, Naoto Kan, Japan’s prime minister, demanded to know “what the hell was going on” at the utility’s critically damaged Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. He also delivered a warning: “If you abandon the plant, I guarantee Tepco will collapse.” | 上周三，日本首相菅直人(Naoto Kan)怒气冲冲地当面质问东京电力公司(Tepco)的高管，要求知道东电旗下严重受损的福岛第一核电站“到底发生了什么”。他还警告称：“如果你们放弃这座核电站，我保证东电肯定会倒闭。” |
| Tepco has not given up its desperate battle to cool overheated reactors and spent fuel tanks at the plant, which was spewing ever more dangerous levels of radiation on Thursday, six days after the 9.0 magnitude earthquake and resulting tsunami. | 东电并未放弃冷却该核电站过热反应堆和乏燃料池的努力，尽管成功希望极其渺茫。上周四，也就是在9.0级地震及随之而来的海啸发生6天之后，该核电站外泄放射性物质的危险等级不断升高。 |
| But even if it manages to bring the emergency under control, Tepco’s future looks bleak. | 不过，即使东电成功控制住这一紧急态势，公司的前景也依然阴云密布。 |
| In the sort term, the utility faces severe difficulties keeping the lights on in Tokyo and the eight surrounding prefectures its serves – an economically crucial area of 44m people that consumes a third of Japan’s electricity. | 东电负责向东京及周边八县供电。该地区拥有4400万人口，经济地位极其重要，用电量占全日本的三分之一。短期而言，东电在保证该地区用电方面面临严重困难。 |
| The earthquake not only knocked out 10 of Tepco’s 14 operational nuclear reactors – six at Fukushima Daiichi and another four at the less-critical Daini plant nearby – it also damaged oil, coal and gas power plants accounting for 7m kW of power, roughly 20 per cent of Tepco’s thermal generating capacity. | 这次地震不仅造成东电旗下14座运营中的核反应堆关闭了10座（其中6座在福岛第一核电站，另外4座在相距不远、情况不是那么危急的福岛第二核电站），还摧毁了发电能力总计达700万千瓦的若干燃油、燃煤和燃气电厂，大致相当于东电热发电能力的20%。 |
| Rolling power cuts and government pleas to save electricity have reduced consumption by about a quarter from the 41m kW average for this time of year. But Tepco is struggling to cope: supply was barely covering demand on Thursday, prompting Tepco to warn of possible uncontrolled blackouts in Tokyo. | 轮流停电措施以及日本政府恳请民众节约用电的呼吁，已促使该地区用电量较每年同期4100万千瓦的平均水平减少了约四分之一。但东电仍穷于应付：上周四的供电量将将够满足需求，东电被迫告诫各方，东京随时都可能突然停电。 |
| “They are in a serious bind,” says Tetsunari Iida, executive director of the Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies, a research group. He blames Tepco and regulators for a narrow-minded focus on nuclear power generation. | 研究机构——可持续能源政策研究所(ISEP)所长饭田哲也(Tetsunari Iida)表示：“他们现在已陷于极大的困境。”饭田哲也批评东电和监管部门目光短浅、只重视核能发电。 |
| Tepco faces even more daunting problems financially. Even in relatively un-litigious Japan, it will be sued, though awards by Japanese courts are rarely crippling. More serious will be the bill for repairs and the additional fossil fuels needed to make up its nuclear shortfall. | 东电在财务方面面临的问题更加令人头大。东电肯定会被起诉——即使是在相对不爱打官司的日本——不过，日本法院作出的裁决很少会让一家企业彻底瘫痪。更加严峻的问题将是维修费用，以及为填补核电造成的供电缺口而必须额外采购的化石燃料的费用。 |
| When Tepco’s seven- reactor Kashiwazaki-Kariya nuclear station was shut by a quake in 2007, it faced Y600bn in repair and conventional fuel costs that fiscal year – more than a 10th of revenues – driving it to its first net loss since the energy crises of the 1970s. | 2007年，拥有7座反应堆的东电柏崎刈羽(Kashiwazaki-Kariya)核电站在一场地震中被关闭，那个财年东电面临6000亿日元的维修及常规燃料采购费用，相当于营收的十分之一以上，该公司由此出现了上世纪70年代能源危机以来的首次净亏损。 |
| The Fukushima Daiichi station is a write-off and in any case is likely to be dangerously radioactive for a long time. The extent of damage to Daini is unclear. Even if repairable, prospects for restart are poor: the first reactor at Kashiwazaki-Kariya was not back on-line for 2½ years, and three of the seven are still awaiting approval to restart – permission that may not be granted now that nuclear power has taken a massive reputational hit. | 福岛第一核电站已是一笔报废的资产，而且不管冷却行动结果如何，该核电站都很可能会在很长一段时间内具有危险的放射性。福岛第二核电站的受损程度尚不清楚。即使能够修复，重新启用的前景也很悲观：柏崎刈羽核电站关闭两年半之后，它的首座反应堆才恢复运转，该核电站7座反应堆中的3座目前仍等待批准以重新启用——鉴于此次核电业声誉严重受损，监管部门可能不会对此开绿灯。 |
| Tepco’s own reputation is also at rock bottom and may not recover. It was already grappling issues of trust after several scandals and accidents: Kashiwazaki-Kariya was designed to absorb weaker seismic shocks than its area’s geology required, and the plant leaked radiation in the 2007 quake. In 2003, regulators closed all its reactors for a month after safety data were found to have been faked. In spite of the bravery of the 300 technicians at the Daiichi site – including the “Fukushima 50” who stayed behind after an evacuation on Tuesday – Tepco management has been censured for its handling of the emergency. | 东电自身的声誉也跌至谷底，而且可能无法恢复如初。东电原本就在极力应对信任问题，因为它此前已多次曝出丑闻和事故：柏崎刈羽核电站的设计抗震能力竟低于所在地区的地质情况要求，而且该核电站在2007年的地震中曾出现放射性物质泄漏。2003年，监管部门发现东电伪造安全维护数据后，曾把该公司旗下所有反应堆关闭了一个月。尽管身处福岛第一核电站现场的300名技术人员勇气可嘉——其中包括在上周二的撤离行动后留守的“福岛50壮士”——但东电管理层对这一紧急事态的处置却备受谴责。 |
| Mr Kan criticised its slowness in reporting a hydrogen-gas explosion that damaged the roof of the facility’s No. 1 reactor on Saturday, and questions are sure to be asked about why military fire engines were only called to the site on Thursday, six days after the crisis began. | 菅直人批评东电在汇报氢气爆炸一事上行动迟缓——3月12日发生的那次爆炸炸飞了福岛第一核电站1号反应堆的厂房顶部。东电肯定还会被问到，为何要等到上周四，也就是此次危机爆发的6天之后，才要求派自卫队的消防车到现场。 |
| The government and regulators will have to answer their share of questions too. Katsunobu Oanda, a journalist who has written a book about Tepco, says a dangerously cosy relationship exists between the utility and state overseers. “The regulator and the regulated are old classmates,” he says. | 同样，日本政府和监管部门也得向民众作出自己的交代。曾著书介绍东电情况的记者Katsunobu Oanda表示，东电和政府监管部门之间存在“危险的”密切关系。他说：“监管者和被监管者是同党。” |
| Both sides of what he calls “Japan’s nuclear power mafia” are motivated by a desire to defend atomic power from its critics. The result, he says, has been a closed and defensive corporate culture at Tepco, where managers focus on protecting themselves instead of the company – let alone the country | 他认为双方组成了“日本核电黑手党”，一心只想为核电辩护、使之不受外界批评影响。他说，结果，东电形成了封闭和防御性的企业文化，管理层只顾保护自己、而不是保护公司，更别提保护国家了。 |
| The issue for Tepco is whether it can survive this crisis intact. It has the weakest balance sheet in the global electricity sector with a debt to equity ratio of 228 per cent at the end of December, double the industry average. Moody’s, the credit rating agency, has put Tepco’s debt on review for a possible downgrade, and its shares have plunged 62 per cent this week. They would certainly have fallen more had it not been for daily loss-limits on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. | 东电面临的问题是它能否安然无恙地逃过此难。在全球电力行业中，东电资产负债表的稳健程度堪属末流，去年12月底时它的债务股本比为228%，比业内平均水平高出一倍。信用评级机构穆迪(Moody's)已着手重新评估东电债务，很可能作出降级处理，而东电股价截至上周四累计下跌了62%。如果没有东京证交所(TSE)设置的跌停板保护，东电股价的跌幅肯定会更大。 |
| Possible scenarios include bankruptcy, nationalisation, and the separation of its nuclear business – or all three. Jesse Lentchner, Asia chief executive at BTIG, an institutional broker, predicts a halfhearted liberalisation of Japan’s electricity sector – which has so far done little to challenge Tepco’s regional monopoly – will gather pace. “I would guess that the power generation industry as we know it has come to an end,” he says. “Japanese electricity generation has been a model of uncompetitive practice.” | 东电的可能下场包括破产、国有化和剥离核电业务——或者三种处置方式兼而有之。机构经纪商BTIG的亚洲首席执行官杰西•兰驰纳(Jesse Lentchner)预计，日本电力行业目前有些漫不经心的自由化进程将会加快步伐（迄今为止，这一进程几乎未对东电在该地区的垄断构成任何挑战）。他说：“我认为，我们所熟知的那个日本电力行业已经走到尽头。它的商业模式一直不具有竞争力。” |
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