The First Discourse to Hypatius against the False ...

But if these two wise conclusions (namely) that I should come and that Ishould not come, (both) belong to my Will, this is a single Will of which onehalf does battle with the other half, and when it conquers and is conquered itis crowned in both cases. This is a wonder, that though the Will is one, twoopinions which are not homogeneous are found in its homogeneity. And I know thatwhat I have said is so, but why (it is so) I am not |xiable to demonstrate. For I wonder how that one thing both enslaves it and isenslaved by it. But know that if this was not so mankind would have no freepower of Choice. For if Necessity makes us wish, we have no power of Choice. Andif, again, our Will is bound and has not the power to will and not to will wehave no Freewill. ['The Will is both one and many.']And, therefore, necessity thus demands that there should be asingle thing, and though it is a single thing, when that single thing wills tobe two it is easy for it, and when again it wills to be one or many it is asimple matter for it. For in a single day there are produced in us a greatnumber of Volitions which destroy each other. [Ov. p. 35, l. 5.] This Will is a root and parent; itis both one and many. This Will brings forth sweet and bitter fruit. O free Rootwith power over its fruit! For if it wills it makes its fruits bitter, and if itwills it makes its products sweet. For God to Whom nothing is difficult hascreated in us something which is difficult to explain, and that is, Freewill.And though this (Will) is one, yet there are two opinions in it, that of willingand that of being unwilling ; so that when half of it struggles with andconquers the other half, then the whole of it is crowned by the whole of it. Forthis is an unspeakable wonder, how, though the Will is one, half of it rebelsagainst the Law and half of it is subject to the Law. For, lo, there are in ittwo opinions contending together, for part of the Will desires that Evil shouldbe done, and again, part of it uses restraint and guards against Evil beingdone. And how on the one hand has the Will not been transformed by that part ofit which desires evil things that it may become like its part which desires evilthings ? and how again (on the other hand) has the Will not been converted bythat part of it which loves good things, that the whole of it may become goodlike the part of it which loves good things ? But if both these parts can beconverted to Good or Evil, what shall we call them ? That we should call themEvil (is impossible, for) they can be good,—that we should call them good (isimpossible, for) they can be bad. [Ov. p. 36.] And though these two can be a single thing,yet except they are divided and are two there can be no struggle between them.This is a wonder which we are unable to speak of, and yet we cannot be silentabout it. For we know |xii that a single Will possessed of many conclusions exists in us. But since theRoot is one we do not understand how part of the thought is sweet, and part ofit bitter, even if it does not completely escape our notice. And how, on the onehand, is that bitterness swallowed up by that sweet thing so as to becomepleasant like it ? And how again when it (i.e., the sweet thing) has beenswallowed up is it mixed with that bitter thing so as to become bitter like it ?And again, how when these two frames of mind have been swallowed by one another,and have become one thing affectionately, are they again separated from oneanother and stand one against the other like enemies ? For where was that Mindbefore we sinned that brings us to penitence after sins ? And how is that Mindturned to penitence after adultery, which was raging before adultery ? These areframes of mind which are like leaven to one another, so that they change oneanother and are changed by one another. But here our Truth has conquered the(false) Teachings and bound them so that none of them can bear investigation.