By Ulrich Beck (
People's Daily Online) 15:46, September 22, 2013
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Comments twitter facebook Sina Microblog reddit Under the imploring headline 'We Germans Don't Want a German Europe', GermanFinance Minister Wolfgang Sch?uble recently denied in a newspaper essay that Germanyseeks a political leadership role in the European Union. 'The idea that Germans want toplay a special role in Europe is a misunderstanding', Sch?uble calmed down. 'We are notasking others to be like us. This accusation makes no more sense than the nationalstereotypes that lurk behind such statements.'
But the facts tell a different story, as the political scientist Edgar Grande found out in aEuropean-wide survey. He and his crew studied the discourses on the European crisis indifferent national contexts. His findings point to a remarkably clear difference betweenGermany and the other European countries, including the United Kingdom. Whereas in allcountries supranational actors (the Troika) are acknowledged as powerful players in thenational arena, they are ignored within the public discourse in Germany. This means thatthe German debate on the Euro-crisis was primarily a national debate, while in all othercountries, it was primarily a European debate dominated by supranational and Germanactors. These empirical findings clearly affirm my diagnosis on 'German Europe' which hasevolved in the cause of the Euro-crisis in both its meanings: while Germany is the centre ofdiscussion in all national discourses across Europe, the discussion in Germany itself isalmost exclusively focused on Germany.
With federal elections taking place in September, the visitor to Berlin might expect the cityto be a hot bed of controversy on Europe. But Germany is oddly detached. The Germancampaign ahead of September 22nd general elections has focused on US intelligencesurveillance, the rising cost of energy, child care facilities. That's it. Germany, the key tosolving the Euro-crisis, seems immune to a polarizing dispute over alternatives, none ofwhich is available for free.
Since the Euro-crisis began, many governments across Europe have been swept frompower. The opposite seems to be true with Germany's Chancellor. Germans love AngelaMerkel – first and foremost because she asks little of them. And because Merkel ispracticing a new style of power politics in Europe: Merkiavellism – a combination ofMachiavelli and Merkel. 'Is it better to be loved or feared?' Machiavelli had inquired in ThePrince. His answer is that 'one ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for thetwo to go together, it is much saver to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to bewanting'. Merkiavelli is applying this principle selectively in a new way. Abroad she is to befeared, at home she should be loved – perhaps because she has taught foreign countries tofear. Brutal neo-liberalism to the outside world, consensus with social democratic tinge athome – that is the successful formula which has enabled Merkiavelli constantly to expendher own position of power and that of Germany as well.
And there is a striking discrepancy between the positions of executive elites and theposition of political parties too. In all European countries there are strong Euro-skeptic oranti–European movements and parties giving the increasingly restless citizenry a voice. Tothem the austerity politics imposed on them by their governments are monstrous acts ofinjustice. They are losing their last spark of hope and trust in the national and Europeansystem of politics. This again is not the case in Germany. Here we find a rare state ofconsensus. The two opposition parties, the Social Democrats and the Greens, may bechallenging Merkel's austerity programs in details, but always voted with her inparliament. On the other hand, two of the parties which form Merkel's government, theBavarian CSU and the liberal FDP, are remarkably distant from their own government'sposition.
As a result, the German debate on the Euro-crisis didn't have an opposition in parliament.Rather there is a strange mixture of pros and cons. On the one hand, you find an informal'Grand Coalition' between the government and the opposition, namely the SocialDemocrats and the Greens. On the other hand, this Grand Coalition was opposed byparties which form the government coalition CSU and FDP. There is a strange 'Germanway' exchanging positions in parliamentary voting on a major decision, in which chancellorMerkel could not find full support of her coalition partners.
But the European crisis is coming to a head, and Germany finds itself faced with a historicdecision. It must attempt either to revive the dream and poetry of a political Europe in theimagination of the people or to stick with a policy of muddling through and of usinghesitation as a means of coercion – until the Euro do us part. Germany has become toopowerful to be able to afford the luxury of indecision and inactivity. But Germany is sleep-walking down its own way. Or – as Jürgen Habermas puts it - 'Germany isn't dancing. It'sdozing on a volcano.'
And there is a final paradox: even if Germany is dozing on a volcano, even if there is nodiscussion on the moment of decision, the most likely outcome of the elections is going to bein favor of the next step towards a political European Union. This is because most likelyAngela Merkel will return to the chancellery for a third term. I expect that there will be asilent turn to a politics of more Europe. At the end of the day, switching positions is the keyelement of Merkiavelli's power politics. And saving the Euro and the EU is good for thebook of history.
In the unlikely event that Merkel won't be re-elected, a red-green government wouldindeed take the initiative together with France, Italy, Spain, Poland etc. to correct thedesign flaw of the European Monetary Union and take the next step in completing thepolitical Union: producing a situation, in which Merkel, as opposition, constitutes theinformal part of a 'Grand Coalition'.
Let's look at the German elections through the eyes of the others. In the governments, onthe streets of Europe and in the corridors of Brussels everyone waits to see which wayBerlin will go. 'I will probably be the first Polish foreign minister in history to say so', RadekSikorski declared in 2011, 'but here it is: I fear German power less than I am beginning tofear German inactivity.' Starting on September 23rd, the day after the elections, in oneconstellation or the other, the question: what Europe do we want and how do we get there?will be at the centre of German and European politics. Let's hope it is going to be einanderes Europa, another (cosmopolitan) Europe, able to stand up for itself in a world atrisk, and not eine Deutsche Bundesrepublik Europa – a German Federal Republic ofEurope.
Ulrich Beck is Professor of Sociology at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU).
（Editor：LiangJun、Zhang Qian）
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