本期主要介绍中国上市公司现金持有问题研究的最新论文，以及过往与该研究相关的论文介绍，具体如下：
1.Employment protection and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China's labor contract law
Journal of Banking & Finance
Volume 92, July 2018
Chenyu Cui
Tsinghua University
Kose John
New York University
Jiaren Pang
Tsinghua University
Haibin Wu
City University of Hong Kong
Abstract
Employment protection increases labor adjustment costs and hence the expected costs of financial distress for labor-intensive firms. It follows that these firms are likely to increase their cash holdings to reduce the risk of financial distress when employment protection is strengthened. Consistent with this prediction, we find that labor-intensive firms in China significantly increase their cash holdings following the enactment of China's Labor Contract Law; other contemporaneous shocks do not seem to drive the finding. We also find that two events prior to the enactment that increase the likelihood of enacting the law have a similar effect. Further analysis shows that the impact of the law is concentrated on areas with strict law enforcement, state-owned enterprises, and industries that employ large numbers of migrant workers.
Keywords: Cash holdings; Employment protection; Labor adjustment costs
链接地址：
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426618301110
2. Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China
Journal of Corporate Finance
Volume 40, October 2016, Pages 276–295
Nianhang Xu
Renmin University of China
Qinyuan Chen
Renmin University of China
Yan Xu
Renmin University of China
Kam C. Chan
Western Kentucky University,
Abstract
We examine the relation between political uncertainty and cash holdings for firms in China. We document that, during the first year of a new city government official's appointment, a firm, on average, holds less cash, which is consistent with the grabbing hand hypothesis of politician. Our results are robust to alternative measures of cash holdings, instrumental variable estimation, sub-samples without firms in four major cities, a matched sample approach, and placebo tests. In addition, our additional analyses suggest that a firm holds significantly less cash if: (a) the newly appointed official is from a different city relative to that from the same city, (b) it faces high political extraction risk, and (c) it has strong twin agency conflicts. Lastly, our extended results suggest that the market value of cash holdings is significantly negative during periods of political uncertainty and firms hide their cash by moving it to related firms via related party transactions.
Keywords: Political uncertainty; Cash holdings; Twin agency problem; China
链接地址：
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119916301043
3. Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China
Journal of Corporate Finance
Volume 31, April 2015, Pages 220–245
Qigui Liu
University of Wollongong
Tianpei Luo
University of Wollongong
Gary Gang Tian
University of Wollongong
Abstract
This study examines the effect of family control on the cash holding policy in China. We find that family firms with excess control rights tend to have high cash holdings that are tunneled rather than being invested or paid to shareholders. We further show that the incentive for controlling families to hold cash and for tunneling is exacerbated by the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, i.e., it is weakened after the Chinese Non-tradable share (NTS) reform and strengthened by the presence of multiple large shareholders who probably play no monitoring role in Chinese family firms. Furthermore, family firms’ incentive to hold cash for tunneling is influenced by the unique characteristics of Chinese firms in the following ways: the incentive is stronger when the family founder has one child and face family succession problem, and when the founder has political connections and directly involves in firm’s management; while it is weakened by family founder’s social interpersonal trust with other entrepreneurs through their membership of Chambers of Commerce. Overall, we argue that family firms in China tend to hold high levels of cash for tunneling, which harms firm value, while the severe controlling minority shareholder agency conflicts and unique Chinese family characteristics only make this situation worse.
Keywords: Cash holdings; Family firms; Excess control rights; Family succession
链接地址：
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119915000334
4. The effect of government quality on corporate cash holdings
Journal of Corporate Finance
Volume 27, August 2014, Pages 384–400
Deqiu Chen
University of International Business and Economics
Sifei Li
Beijing Foreign Studies University
Jason Zezhong Xiao
Cardiff University
Hong Zou
University of Hong Kong
Abstract
We use China as a laboratory to test the effect of government quality on cash holdings. We build on, and extend, the existing literature on government expropriation and its interaction with firm-level agency problems by proposing a financial constraint mitigation argument. We find that firms hold less cash when local government quality is high, which is not consistent with the state expropriation argument, but supports the financial constraint mitigation argument. A good government lowers the investment sensitivity to cash flows and cash sensitivity to cash flows, decreases cash holdings more significantly in private firms, and improves access to bank and trade credit financing. We also test and find support for Stulz's (2005) model on the interaction between government and firm agency problems.
Keywords: Cash holding; Government quality; Property rights; Twin agency problems; China
链接地址：
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119914000601
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