本期推送包括三篇近期SSRN工作论文，具体如下：
1.Does Financial Reporting Misconduct Pay Off Even When Discovered?
DAN AMIRAM
Tel Aviv University
SERENE HUANG
Columbia Business School
SHIVARAM RAJGOPAL
Columbia Business School
Abstract
Experts and popular belief suggest that it pays to engage in financial misconduct due to lax enforcement and punishment after 2003. We focus on the most serious cases of financial reporting misconduct and hand collect data on three subsamples of severe misconduct cases, between 2003 and 2016: a sample of 37 (100) SEC enforcement actions (class action lawsuits) that explicitly allege fraud and a sample of 100 restatements with the most negative market reaction in which investors presumably suspect fraud. We then compare estimates of the benefits from the misconduct to top managers against estimates of the costs of its discovery. We find that 32.9% of perpetrators experience an overall net benefit from discovered misconduct. The percentage of officers who benefit is highest for the restatement subsample (43.5%), followed by the class action lawsuit subsample (27.7%), and is the lowest for the SEC enforcement subsample (8.1%). Stated differently, if we assume that the probability of detection is 25% as conjectured in the prior literature, more than half (53%) of the perpetrators in our sample would find it beneficial to engage in financial reporting misconduct. Hence, our evidence suggests that financial reporting misconduct can pay off for a significant portion of the perpetrators. We discuss several implications of our results to academics, practitioners and policymakers.
链接地址：
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3353823
2.Measuring Disclosure Using 8-K Filings
JING HE
University of Delware
MARLENE PLUMLEE
University of Utah
Abstract
We construct four voluntary disclosure and two mandatory disclosure measures using 8-Ks and validate the voluntary disclosure measures. The first voluntary disclosure measure is the count of 8-Ks. The second and third voluntary disclosure measures are the count and word count of the items and exhibits within 8-Ks classified as voluntary (items 2.02, 7.01, and 8.01). The final voluntary disclosure measure is the count of the voluntary 8-K items and exhibits that include management guidance, conference calls, non-GAAP measures, or investor days. We validate the voluntary disclosure measures by examining (1) theoretical associations between them and information asymmetry and the cost of equity and (2) their links with theoretical determinants of voluntary disclosure. The mandatory disclosure measures are the count and word count of the items and exhibits within the 8-K items classified as mandatory. The results suggest that our voluntary disclosure measures capture the underlying construct in the literature.
链接地址：
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3354252
3.Deterrent Disclosure
STEPHEN GLAESER
University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill
WAYNE R. LANDSMAN
University of North Carolina Kenan
Abstract
We examine how product market competition affects the disclosure of innovation. Theory argues that product market competition can cause firms to increase their disclosure of innovation to deter competitors. Consistent with this argument, we find that firms in more competitive industries voluntarily accelerate their patent disclosures, which are credibly disclosed via the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Our inferences are robust to using staggered changes in industry-level import tariffs as shocks to competition in a differences-in-differences design. In total, our results suggest that product market competition increases patent disclosure, consistent with firms using the disclosure of innovation to deter product market competition.
链接地址：
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3342691
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