本期推送三篇RAST 2019 conference的文章，具体如下：
Review of Accounting Studies 2019 Conference
December 13-14, 2019
Singapore Management University
55 Armenian Street
Homepage:
https://www.regonline.com/builder/site/default.aspx?EventID=2568171
1.Does Financial Reporting Misconduct Pay Off Even When Discovered?
Dan Amiram
Tel Aviv University
Serene Huang
Columbia Business School
Shivaram Rajgopal
Columbia University
Experts and popular belief contend that it pays to engage in financial misconduct. We hand collect data on three subsamples of severe misconduct cases, between 2003 and 2016: a sample of 37 (100) SEC enforcement actions (class action lawsuits) that explicitly allege fraud and a sample of 100 restatements with the most negative stock price reaction in which investors presumably suspect fraud. We then compare estimates of the benefits from reporting misconduct to top managers against estimates of the costs of its discovery. We find that 32.9% of perpetrators experience an overall net benefit from discovered misconduct. The percentage of officers who benefit is highest for the restatement subsample (43.5%), followed by the class action lawsuit subsample (27.7%), and is the lowest for the SEC enforcement subsample (8.1%). Stated differently, if we assume that the probability of detection is 31% as conjectured in the prior literature, more than half (52%) of the perpetrators in our sample would find it beneficial to engage in financial reporting misconduct. Hence, our evidence suggests that financial reporting misconduct can pay off for a significant portion of the perpetrators. We discuss several implications of our results to academics, practitioners and policymakers.
https://accountancy.smu.edu.sg/sites/accountancy.smu.edu.sg/files/accountancy/pdf/Symposium/Paper1_ShivaramRajgopal.pdf
2.The Effects of MiFID II on Sell-Side Analysts, Buy-Side Analysts, and Firms
Bingxu Fang
University of Toronto
Ole-Kristian Hope
University of Toronto
Zhongwei Huang
City,University of London
Rucsandra Moldovan
Concordia University
This paper provides early but broad empirical evidence on a major new investor protection regulation in Europe, MiFID II, which requires investment firms to unbundle the investment research from other costs they charge to clients. We predict that the price separation resulting from unbundling and a hard dollar system leads to a shrinking of the market for sell-side investment research, manifested in lower quantity of sell-side coverage that is of higher quality than before the regulation. We test our predictions in difference-in-differences matched-sample research designs with firm fixed effects. We find a decrease in the number of sell-side analysts covering European firms after MiFID II implementation, particularly for firms that are less important to the sell-side. However, research quality improves; specifically, individual analyst forecasts are more accurate and stock recommendations garner greater market reactions. In addition, sell-side analysts seem to cater more to the buy-side after MiFID II by providing industry recommendations along with stock recommendations. Importantly, we find evidence that buy-side investment firms turn to more in-house research after MiFID II implementation. Equally interesting, buy-side analysts increase their participation and engagement in earnings conference calls compared to the control group. Finally, we find some evidence that stock market liquidity decreases post-MiFID II. Our findings have implications beyond Europe, as investors are currently pressuring the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt a similar regulation.
https://accountancy.smu.edu.sg/sites/accountancy.smu.edu.sg/files/accountancy/pdf/Symposium/Paper2_BingxuFang.pdf
3.Measuring Disclosure Using 8-K Filings
Jing He
University of Delaware
Marlene A. Plumlee
University of Utah
We construct four voluntary disclosure and two mandatory disclosure measures for 260,880 firm-quarters from 2005 through 2016 using 8K data. The first voluntary disclosure measure is the count of 8Ks, a proxy used in prior studies. The second and third voluntary disclosure measures are the count and word count of the 8K items that are classified as voluntary (Items 2.02, 7.01, and 8.01) and the associated exhibits. The final voluntary disclosure measure is the count of the voluntary 8K items and exhibits that include management guidance, conference calls, non-GAAP measures, or investor day disclosures. We document some basic properties of these measures (including their correlations and persistence) and cross-sectional and time-series associations between the measures and firm-level characteristics frequently examined in the disclosure literature. The results suggest that, even though the measures are highly correlated, each of them also capture different aspects of firms’ disclosure activities. Further, we document consistent associations between the level of the voluntary disclosure measures and various firm characteristics, the signs of those associations, and differences in the magnitudes and the signs of those associations across the disclosure measures. We also construct concurrent mandatory disclosure measures based on the mandatory items and exhibits within 8Ks to use as controls. Finally, we provide preliminary descriptive evidence of the content of information provided within the three voluntary 8K items and evidence of their persistence.
https://accountancy.smu.edu.sg/sites/accountancy.smu.edu.sg/files/accountancy/pdf/Symposium/Paper3_MarlenePlumlee.pdf
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